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SPECIAL COLLECTIONS 
I to s the 
thesis., is the thesis no set 
statelllents can entail an evaluative statement. The signi-
ficance of this thesis for moral philosophy, ethics,t and esthetics is 
the thesis true, it is impossible to give objective just 
fication of any kind of value ,judgment -- in the strong sense of justi­
that requires a statement of the grounds to entail a statement 
of propos or position, that the grounds allegedly 
John R. Searle has challenged the nonderivability thesis in his 
now well-known 
san 
placed 
can or 
".J.l.�Cn!LLS es depending 
to Derive tOught! from • lit 'lflherein he 
�'" 
., 1 modified this 
of his general theory of speech acts., 
sect this paper I consider 
both his opponents hold a 
thes ., According to 
a moral ought-statement from purely des 
one defines morality., s" 
over the thes comes 
con-
one 
es that in erver theory one can derive a 
tatement from purely descriptive premises., if I 
corre 
1 
that 
. . rs 
·u,.�� 
I 
purely premises " 
In the second section I consider Searlets treatment of what he 
the Fallacy Fallacy" in chapter VI of his book, 
Speech Adts� In this chapter Searle presents three cases where he thinks --:::..-- --
an evaluative statement is derived from purely descriptive premises" 
I that each of the three attempted derivations 
the third, and , section, I deal with Searle's 
argument, both in its earlier 964) version, and in its more 
recent formulation in Speech �$ 
" 
philosophy is that commonly 
as runs the opening sentence of the 
duction a recent VOlUn'lfF'·of readings on this issue.1 (1 The Is-
Ought Question, by W .. De Hudson (New York, .1969)J Taken as a 
statement about the preoccupations of moral philosophers of the 
present century" we can accept this assertion. The problem qf how 
statements of fact are related to moral judgments has dominated 
recent moral philosophy .. Associated with this problem is 
Which. has also been given considerable attention -- the quest 
of how morality is to be defined .. The two issues are linked, Since 
some definitions of morality allow us to ll'Dve from statements of 
fact to moral jUdgments, while others do not .. 1 
So run the opening lines of an article by Peter Singer, enti 
liThe Triviality of the Debate OVer fls-Ought! and the Definition of 
f .. tI Singer discusses two possible definitions of morality 
s that under one definition moral conclusions follow from 
statements of fact, but under the other definition no facts entail 
(2 
conclusions" The definition of morality Which Singer contends 
inference from statements of fact to moral conclusions is 
calls the descriptivist definition .. 
the direct opposite 
to be a moral principle ,  as the 
it must satisfy criteria of both form and content., .... 
The strength of the descriptivist view is that once the 
of morality is accepte d, watertight reasoning from statements of 
conclusions is possible., This means that (to 
used earlier) from the that money will 
and increase happiness to a greater extent if given 
ef than if spent on a Mercedes, Jack can argue that 
Bill ought, morally, to give the money to famine relief rather 
more ive car., the s t is right in 
to happiness, ally asses 
reSisting argument, for conclus 
froya the definition of morality the facts of the case$2 
would be ) Moral doing whatever conducive 
ss redUcing suffering, imparti assess 
ss 
resul t fl""Om 
famine x'elief instead of buying tbe l<lercedes / .. • <» D) Bill ought to 
sive his money to fa.mine relief'., Tbis definition of morality, baving 
both f'o� and content requiremen'bs, simultaneously gives the criteri a 
for detel"mining whether to apply the terms lI:moral tI OJ:> IInomnora.ll1 to a 
given situ ation as well as "moralll and "immoral" .. However, in func .... 
tioning as a criterion for the application of IImoralu and Himmoraln 
the definition takes on the force or mode of an evalua tion -- i .. e..., 
assuming 'tihat "moral It and uinnnoral n are evaluati V8 terms :; the defll1.i-
onls function as a criterion for ttte applic ation of these evaluative 
terms amounts to a set of assertions -that states ":! affairs .X, Y, and Z 
(those states of affairs �ihich .by tbis definition can be proper'ly called 
limoraln) have positive v alue", and stat es of af'f'airs A, B, and G (those 
states of affairs which by this definition can pe properly called 
"irnmoralll) have negative value e 
it is true as Singer says that the mor al conclusion f'ollolfS 
i:t­
deduot1y&ly from the definition of morality and the facts of the case; 
this way of putting it m.ay be somewhat misleading", �fuen one tblnl�s 
a definition he does not usually considel" the peculiar nature of 
some :raw concepts like Ifmoral It tI lIethical n and ilgood U l'li1ich have tI by 
linguistic convention, served as indicators of value judgmen:ts", In 
de1'il1hlg one of' these terms in a manner that entails a cI'iteria 1'0:1:' 
application to states of affail's vle bave in effect; ere d a 
clple for the application of value to states of aff'a1:i:'s � an evaluative 
be ob.jected that the conc lusion does not stl'ictly 1'ollol-1 i'rom 
ern,,,, .... ,,., ses ) and (2)., Proponents fS esis 1I1Ould 
ax'gue that there 8.1"8 8eraantical rules connecting UobllgationU 
acts n and t10ughtll to llbbllgat1on1t• 
s e, 
some definitions of morality counter 
thesis (the thesis that no set of 
descript statement s can entail an evaluative stat ement), since his 
premise which crucial 
to the argument, namely the descriptivist definition of morality. Conse-
quent ly we are this point apparently not condemned to discuss a 
trivial issue. �A�O�Ton, I would like to consider one more argument to 
the effect that under a given definition of moralit y  moral conclusions 
follow from statements of the facts alone. 
Glen 0 .. Allen presents an elaborate example in "The Is-Ought Question 
Reformulated and Answered"u.3Allen formulates the issue in terms of 
observer theory, Which is, of course, just another of the many 
tive definitions of moralit y. Thus Allen's article may be construed as 
enting an elaborate example of fS thesis" To begin 
s a analYSis ought-st order to establish a 
that support the erver 
" The cuss th o 
a convenient excuse to some of the neces exploration 
the re between the different sorts of t 
s -s Sl> 
dis ought-stat 
the 
e 
other success or in 
s the assessment 
conditions me accepted standards of scientific evidence, 
the of • 'X ought to occur' means 
the same as f X  is more probable than NX'e Theoretical ought-statements 
can be deduced from 
the following manner: 
(2) Conditions C obtain 
laws and statements of existing conditions 
Under conditions X is more probable 
$ $ (3) X is more probable than NX, and 
(3) f X ought to occur. However,. this does not qualify as a case of 
an evaluative statement from a set of purely descriptive state-
$ e the type of evaluation underlying the conclusion , 
as mentioned previously, an assessment of eXisting conditions (or, 
the case of hypotheticals, the assessment made of stipulated condi-
t ) as they as an instance of the conditions 
s 
as an 
the antecedent 
different than 
of 
an asses of 
tance of those 
no reason to cons 
s 
ob jected 
our 
an accepted theoretical 
ordinary statement 
'X case f '" 
fact. a s 
conditions as to whether they 
statements 
ac 
seems 
-statement to be of a 
s 
seems 
ation of the accepted standards of scientific 
the 
asserting probablell one may either 
as ing 
fie evidence 
that given currently accepted 
probable, or he may be asserting this 
of scienti­
the same 
case is 
a tacit endorsement of the current standards$ If the latter 
be judged as the correct interpretation of the theoretical 
ought-statement that is the conclusion of the above argument, then 
premise, (1 ) Under conditions is more probable than 
would appear to be open to the same evaluative interpre since 
conclusion simply the consequent of the conditional form of 
derived by application of l?0n,en�. to ) and (2) : C:;)P., C 
, P uative the conclusion, "t'lfould se em to be 
in as ill , the conclus n of 
the ore ought argument as evaluative not give us a case 
as 
s 
an evaluative 
s us to cons one 
to most 
some necess 
a specified end. Consequently 
common a 
s 
cies 
caus 
A 
of the 
ought-statements are 
between 
can 
manner: 
a neces 
ill 
of 
s, 
) 
the rule) 
of' A is a neceSS8..l?y condl tion :for the achieveluent of end 15 then$ 
P vlants to acb.ieve E, P ought to pel"form A /"",, (3) If' P wants to 
achieve E,l P ought to peI'form A. Again" as in tb.e case of' the theo­
retical ought-statements, the sense of' evaluation undel"lying the ought 
is a 'Luere asses sment ot: a set of t:acts,. L11. this case the assessment 
is rather complicated, involving the consideration of a 'Hide variety 
of' instan ces of the occurrence of E and the compar ison of the facts 
to the inductive standards and theoretical reqUirements cur:t.'>ently in 
use so that it can be determined Hhether the re is sufficient evidence 
to warrant the classification of E:> A as a causal lairT" or,ll in other 
"'lords" to establish that A 1s a necessary cond.ition for E" The assess­
ment involved he re seems to be no diff'erent in kind than that implicit 
in the the oretical ought-statement and e:ny ol�clin ary statement of fact" 
If it is insisted that the implicit approval of cUl"'rent inductive stan­
dards and theoretical requirelnents for the establishment of causal, laws 
is also involved, then the result 'i�ould be that premise (1) I!J t:he state­
ment of the causal lavl" 'i;;fould involve this evaluation as sUI'ely as the 
oonolusion. Thus, Nith this type ot: practical ought-stat;ement we have 
not been able tiO derive an evaluative statement from a set of p'lu'ely 
desCl"'iptive statementsii' 
lulen mentions in passing another type of practioal ought-at 
This type spec:U'iea the best. of alternative means to a given endj as 
opposed to the speoification o f  a necessary cond1tiol1.f) Thel"'e a1'e two 
possil)le interpl"'etatlons this type of ought-statement .. One alterl1.a-
t1 va is to tiake "best It as meaning some descript property like Uthe 
most; 1c:tentr "the ickest�1 nthe most sectu"e;� et c .. ., In this case 
vIe can simply 1ncol"'porate tbe specif'ied. property :Ln·to the end desil"'ed, 
s 
" 
same as 
you 
$ you ought to take route 66J' 
to go to Chicago, you ought to take route 
to Chicago is via route 66.#1 
"best alternative means 
given preferableu or ftintuitively, or 
If as 
preferable!' this case the ought-statement is clearly evaluative; 
it seems this kind of ought-statement cannot be derived from 
causal and statements of the facts alone. Suppose we have a 
to effect that the performance of A is a means to (sufficient 
condition for) the achievement of end under conditions C; and suppose 
C obtain., does follO:Vl from these facts that 
one end to A --
of act A morally or preferable 
by means. This clear because the 
t -s that t one 
means to achieving is cons tent with these <Ii 
an ive se the 
is or the 
means 
Given Allen's statement that n ...... there appears to be no prima facie 
reason for thinking that the concern with causal laws is to be set 
aside when we about morally obligatory choices� I take it that 
for him the paradigm case of a morally oblig�tory choice is the case 
where the person is obligated to perform a certain action, not because 
that action intrinsically desirable or valuable, but because that 
action is the means to a morally desirable end. The generation of a 
moral ought in such a paradigm case would take the following form .  
tive 
(1 ) E is a morally des end .. 
(2) The performance of act A is a neces:sary condition for the 
achievement of 
(3) (By definition of morality; or a moral principle) Everyone 
i s  morally obligated perform those acts conducive to the 
realization desirable ends .. 
) ( ) If one is morally obligated to perform 
then one ought to perform 
(5) p 
(6 ) 
(7) 
), Which 
in the 
) P morally oblig�ted to perform 
ought to perform A .. 
to the derivation, is an 
evaluative .. Premise (2) an 
sense of (the sense 
asses of fact discussed in connection with 
ought , 
a 
this as it 
from 
we 
cruc 
case 
yet to cons 
Which he says cover 
to do caus 
Norality 
s 
persons,. 
r theory this: 
a matter of having better and 
a matter of acting and reacting 
, to reliable 
dge, one must first become 'a moral person, or at 
of understanding empathically the perspective of a 
7 
defined in ideal obse 
exhibited by an ideal observer, a completely moral person in that he 
habitually s the morally appropriate ways,. Given the 
circumstance that Allen assumes, that we already are rl10ral persons, 
then the only question that arises with respect to the appropriate 
thing to' 
achieve 
the neeess 
s 
or 
in given circumstance is a practical one: t 
end, which we, as moral persons, 
we ought do then, as , be deduced 
in the circumstances, since they 
cient conditions for the 
i,.e,., once we know what 
seems to recognize, 
a 
? important 
to whether or not one 
one has the 
are so can 
or 
seem a ,. 
us 
R 
or 
that the decision to oall certain tl"aits mOl'"'ul 
does not 
l"equirecl by the facts -- i .. 8 .. , a. given set of statements fact en'tail 
that type :rl person a 1.1loral person, or that traits X, Y:, and Z s.re 
moral traits, P, Q" and R immoral .. Allen gives a ratller sketchy argu­
ment which seems to be aimed at suggesting that -chis latter alternat ive, 
the :tactually based definition of mOl'al peI'sonhood, is viable as a 
foundation for ideal-observer theory . 
the 
th.e 
Unable to agree on lv-hat rules of condu.ct perso ns ought to observe" 
we !uight be equally unable to agree on 't.rhat kind o f  pel�sons we 
t'iould call moral persons It AccordinglY!i we must look ;tor the ideal 
observe:!." as som ething internal to human nature and already mani­
fested in human consciousness" Since these conditions are met by 
what is generally called the consci,enee $ we are led to ask \'ihether 
the conscience might be interpreted and e;;cplained as at least an 
incipient ideal observer emergent from more rudimentary capabilities 
universally pos sessed by all human beings in virtue of vlhich they 
are human. 
AccordinglYt I underst and fconsciencs T to be the vl01"'d designa:ting 
that capab:l11ty and tendency whicb people generally bave to react 
toward themselves as objects of value or disvalue. Huch an inter­
pretation 01' conscience is $I on tb,e one hand, consis ten 'h with the 
general theory that values should be interpreted causally and., on 
the other', that cons c ience is emergent from the more rUdimentary 
capabil:i.ty of self-consciousness" The sentiments of proper pride 
and selr-respect 0111" contrarily.li shame and J:'emorse" are the 1/101"'11: 
of conseienceo They a1"'e t�be consequences of' our appraising 
judging ours elv es as persons from an impartial peI'spective, the 
perspective" one might say, of an ideal or normal observer not 
sharing QUI" egotistical biases .. Consciences, of' course, are 
infallible; nor do tboy always function properly; nor is it 
sible to subdue tb,e conscience or to cause it "to atrophy. 
less, t;he conscience 1s a natural piece of human equipment, 
the natural tendency is for it to develop and to 111onitor conduct, 
rewax'ding us f'o:[' the sort of behaviol" �',e generally 
people and punisb us for the sort of beha.vior t-Ie 
repugnant .. Tbus, provides one the same 
knO'1illedge a:md moral mo'ti vation., 9 
a.J:."8 the al premises to this • !J 
oonc11;1s conscience pl"ovides a 1 on, or 
!I or observ�n'"? The eS are 
J 
) 
impart 
.. 
to 
conscience .. 
spect, shame remorse 
judge ourselves as persons �rom an 
, premise (1) does not seem to be a statement of fact. Why 
must the ideal observer be, or be exemplified by, something internal 
to human n ature and already mani�ested in human consciousness? \�y not 
a complete behavioral model derived from a computer programmed 
available information on human behavior and psychology aimed pro-
the 
a 
or 
) 
2 )  
3 
appropriate fromula for the most ient means to ensure 
s, tence, free 
education, c. ? It seems clear that premise (1 either 
embodies a value .. ses ) (5 ) are uncon-
do not, even conjunction th 
the conclusion that conscience , or provides 
erver or moral person .. 
es conclusion. 
can consistently 
se 
that conscience is appropriate model for the 
must be to the 
conscience are 
on" 
the 
or 
$ 
. 
s 
produce performance �lct; 
l4) Conditions C obtain 
(.5) P ougb.t to per.form A c 
It is my contention, of course, that premise (1) involves a mOl"al 
evaluation; and" consequently" that Allen has not provided us with 
a counterexample to the nonderivability thesis. 
N,atural:l.stic pa;Llacy Fallacy 
Be.fore considering Searlets .famous promising case I would like to 
examine some less elaborate arguments he - gives in the section of Spee,c!I 
10 � on the "Naturalistic Fallacy Fallacylf \\Thich do not involve the 
concepts of institutional rules and obligations. \fuat is the natura11.stic 
fallacy fallacy? nIt is the fallacy of supposing that; it is logically 
impossible for anY' set of statements of tbe kind usually called descrip­
tive to entail a statement of the I-dnd usually called evaluative �111 In 
other v10rds, according to Searle tbe naturalistic fallacy .fallacy is 
the nonderivability -theSis" arle gives thl"'ee cases to support his 
position. � 
Beginning his first case Searle agree s '\oJith J .. OQ Urrason that 
"valid!! is an evaluative 'tel"m .. !fTo speak of a good argument is in luost 
12 contexts tlo spe�lk of Et valid argtUllent�". U and a e . .. to call an argument 
valid is not merely to classify j_t logically"""it is at least in part 
to evaluate or appralse l't; :t t is to sign:tfy appl""oval of 
then proceeds to give a deScl"iptive definit:ton of Hvalid deductive 
argument!! that appears to be C01"l"'ect: Ux is a valid deductive argument 
,.t:�=::.;� dt r a. (1odu:.;tivc o.reUfn.ent OJ.'J.d. the premise2i of X 0n.ta.::i.l the, c,c.n ... '14 
elusion 0;[" X .. II From ,tl1!s dei'in:L tior!. and -the descl">ipttVG stutoment I!X 
is a decl.uei:;i ve arglnnent :i.n IrJhicb. the prem:l.ses en·tail the conclusion Ii 
this, as .seal'�le claims !I i;i Claf;;6 of desertptive pl"emises entailing an 
evaluative conclusion? I th:lnk not .. To begin 1r11th.l' if "valid" really 
is an evaluatlve tertn� tben, in defining it in such a irmy 0.13 to set 
dONn a c.I'lterion for its a.pplication to states of af'fai.rs, He have.\> in 
effect, created. a principle gov0J:>ning the applics.tion of va.lue to states 
of af:t.'air's, an evaluative prind.ple t' 
However, I do not tbink that \V'e should considel" ltvalid II to 'be an 
evaluative term. in this context. Granted that laymen use the ·cerra. in 
a.11 evaluative H8.y -- i ... 6., to indicate approval of any argument, ox' 
statement, that happens ·to be convincing -- ltval1d" in philosophical 
contexts is ol�dinl;1..rily used L'1.S a techn:lcal, descJ?ip'c.ive term, raeuning 
roughly flconfor.ming to the 1"u163 oJ': infel'lonce of logical SystioIll Sn 
or uconi'orming to 1'ules of inference A, B, a�Y It is tr'ue that; the 
;pules of loeical sy,�te:ms t.'lI'6 usually designed to allow ttJ8 inf'ol"euces 
hrhich the creatoX' (8) of' i:;he system consider good. or desirable inferences" 
But tbis simply means tb.I.I.'G the valid infel'snces in a g:i.'ITen systiErm l)..):'e 
valued .. This does not make "valid" an evaluative term any tnore thon 
designate gualitiE18 tbv:t bappen to be valued" 
On 'the other hand, tb(jJ.-oe does seem to be an infrequent use of 
"vo.lid II in philosophical contexts that is evaluative III �;ince lIvCi.l::i.d It 
:Ln each logical systerf.! is the teJ:"ID a"ppllecl to the inf'erences Hhich 
ElS S OC s 
not surpl'>ising that a sense of val has developed as an. :tndicatol"'> 
a posi tlve evaluation., 80 !',r6 have 'two distinct senses of IIvalidll .. One 
i� purely descriptive and defined l..;ithin a logical sy :stem in ter'IDs of 
the inf'erence rules a. system .. The other tra.nscends, or �I.s not rela-
tive to" speoific logical systems, and function8 evaluatively as an 
indica'cor of approval. 
No�v, lfentalll1lentlt is a technical 'cerro defi:r.l.ed Hithin logical sys ­
tems i n  terms of the axioms and rules a s  i s  the descriptive sense of 
"valid"" liEntailmentli and uvalidu are interde.fined within most systems 
such -chat v1Then an inferenoe conforms to cer tain rules 8J.1.d axioms it :}.s 
at once a cas!, of a valid inference, and an entailment or mater5.al impli­
cationfl The evalua-I;ive s ense of "valid H cannot be defined in tex'ms of: 
entailment because it transcends specific logical systems� The definition 
Seal"le gives of IIval :ld " :16 in terms of entailment;, so the sense OJ": !lvalidlt 
there must be -the technical descr:lptive sense$' Consequently, the sense 
of IIvalidJl in -the conclusion is descriptive as well; and, thus" Seal�le 
has not derived an evaluative s tatement from descriptive premisesa, 
Ifm-revex'" if arle insis 1;;s that there is a sense 01' "valid II that 
captures both the descriptive and evaluative elements of tbe two aenses 
lIvalidll cussed above, tben I reply that; my initial argument" tha'c 
the descriptive definit:ton of' tb (and any other) evaluative 
constiittltes an evaluative principle, applies" 
The second case Searle gives to lllustl"'ate the naturalistic fallacy 
involves a grading term apples, 
cha.racter l�. $ 
of Agriculture and Fisheries has as 
C,,1t any apple with cb.aracterist 
s 
the descriptive s 
A, B, and a" we can derive the e valuative s 
� To this I would simply reiterate the, 
by now familair, argument that, if Gradel! is truly an 
term, d efini tion counts as an e valuative principle, 
by virtue of its functioning as a criterion for the deter mination of 
the of a class of things, n amely apples; and it can properly 
be considered an evalu ive statement expressing, or involving, the 
evaluation of a class of things, namely those apples with characteristics 
A, and 0$ I am more inclined though, interpret IYExtra Fancy 
It as a mere, nonevaluative, classificatory term as used by the 
lVl1nistry, perhaps, an evalu ative sense when used by the lay 
the 
car 
example of the naturalistic acy is 
se a man statement of his ter of 
assessing cars.. further that he gives an e laborate 
description of car" Suppose also that the conjunction of 
criteria and descriptio n  are sufficient to entail that the car 
cars 
; that is, are to 
, a good car .. 
scription, the man still not s 
thout making further assumptions ���. 
can it yet b e  said that giving 
even s car .. 1 
the assessment of cars 
cs A, 
sense 
sense an 
a s 
the 
( 
s th c.harac-ceris t;:lcs B, and G.)<Il Consequently, 
is derivati on does not pI'ooeed fx'om purely desoriptive preTilises" 
There remains one type of attempted der ivation to be considel."'ed: 
'the derivati on of an institutional ought-statemente J-ohn R" Searle has 
proposed a very interesting and troublesome derivs:l;ion vvhich has deter­
mined 'the focus of the controversy over the is-ough'c issue since his 
article Ii Hm.,f to Derj.ve t Ought. from f Is til was publishe d in 1964016 
Searle t S Arsmnent 
The full form of Searle's argument, including what he conSiders 
mediating tautologies� is as follows: 
l1 ) 
(1 a) 
(1 b) 
t2 ) 
t2a) 
(3) 
Ua) 
Db) 
(4· ) 
\49.) 
(4-b ) 
(5 ) 
J'ones uti.,ered tbe words " I  her eby .promise to pay you, Smith, 
five c101lars,,11 
Ui"lder certain conditions G anyone )'lho utters the vlords (sen ... 
'bence ) It! hereby promise to pa.y tO�lS! smith, f'ive dollars II 
prorrlises to pay Smith f'ive dollars .. 
Gond1tions C obtain .. 
Jones promised to pay Smith f'ive dollarse 
All promises are acts o� placing one self under (undertaking) 
an obligatio n '1:;0 do the thing promised .. 
Jones placed himself' under (undertook) an obligation to pay 
th five dollars� 
Other things are equal .. 
All those who place themselves under an obligation ar6;J other 
things being equal, under an obligation .. 
s is under B-r.l. obligat;ion to PQ·y Smith five dollarsfl\ 
Other things 1iil.re equal .. 
Otbex' things being equal, one ought to do '<'lhat one is under 
obligation to do. 
J"ones ought to pa,y Smith five dollars. 
'llhere are tHO major criticisms of th:i.s argument I l..rould like t;o 
consider'. �rhe first is the cri tic:J.sm of James and Judith 'rb.omso:n, 
17 
advanced article "Emf Not to Derive fOugll'li' from t 
Thomsons focus on premises (3@.) and \if.a). 'I'hey contend that th61"'e ar6 
t e t\ilO premises j sense" 
8enS0 H� . <>O 1Slre cons 
J"ona is CaS6j see no rea.son or l{now of no l"eason vlhy b.e ought not or 
need not pay Cor be under Si.l'l obligation to pay) .. But if' this is Wb�lt 
(Lj.a) comes to" then (!�.) and lLj.a) surely do not e ntail (5) � That none 
18  
of' us sees or' knows of' a reason just does not entail that there is n one ... " 
So under the ""TeaIr il1terpre ta.tion of' (3a) and (Lj.a) the argument breaks 
down a.t those points" The strong interpretation is that n .. 0 "other things 
are equal if tbere is nothing sufficient to make it false that Jones 
19 
ought to pay r or be under an obligation) .. " """ .. it is plausible to say 
that (5) is entaile d by (Lj.j together with fThere is no conclusive reason 
to think it; false to say that Jones ought to pay f {or ':Phel:'6 is no 
20 
1"eason all to think it false to say that J'ones ought to pay.}� n 
problem with us ing this strong sense of' \Lj.a} (atld Ua» is that it 
seems to be evaluative" since it involves 'the evaluation of every existing 
oircmnstance as being insuff'icient -to make it false that Jones ought to 
pay (or be under atl obl igation) f) 
'rue second criticism of Searle's original argument I want to 
consider is that of R" JYI. Haps, presented in nThe Promising Gams",21 
Hare the accusH.tion that; th81"6 is appar';mtly an equivocation 
on Hpromise Il invol vad, since if (1:it) is true i 1:; is virtue of one 
definition, ( j is true it must by virtuB of a different 
definition. The definition used in l1a) requires only that certain 
er(lpiric�;tl eondi "(;ion3 be met: conditions C and the uttel-'/lUlCe of 1I I 
reby prom:Lse The definition used in (2a) however$' requires that 
,9.:n ion taken, something that seems not to d 
by condi required by defini·tion us in (1 a)., 
" II' .. �\ raan who s WI px>omis8fp c" u satisfied one 
of conditions promia !' but may not bave satisfied tine 
other; he may have s the tITords, but may not have there by 
placed upon himself any obligation .. vie can only say that be has 
suoceeded in doing this if' '!tIe consent; to the synthetic principle 
(1 lit. )-* LV Under cart ain condi t ious O anyone who utters the l-Tords 
\Sentience) 11 hereby promise to pay you, Smit;h, five dollars f 23 places himself under an obligation to pay Smith five dollars .. 22J 
Hi seems to me that Hare is right about -this .. Given the fact 
that conditions G together 'Iifith the utterance by J"ones of.' III hereby 
promise G .. " Ii do not entail that an obligation 'i,Jas undertaken, there 
seems to be an inconsist;ency in Searle's argument .. Let �Ct represent 
itConditions a obtain and Jones uttered t I  hereby promise ..... Jtf Let fon 
represent If Jones placed himself under an obligation ...... l1 Let f P Ii repre­
sent II Jones promised to pay StIli"lih five dollars �t The fact that condi tiona 
C togethel"' with the utterance by 30nes of !II hereby prom:i.se", .. '" f! does 
not entail that Jones placed himself under an obligation to pay Smith 
't,rould then be represented thus: tN(0-30}J (1a) vfOuld be Y(C...ojP)J (2a ) 
would be f (P-eO)J :rlhe inconsistency can be demonstrated thus: 
(1 ) tv (C-SO) 
(2) ( C-!JP) 
(3) (P-30) 
\Lj.) (C�O) 
t5 } "" (O-!)O) E> (O�O) 
fact 
(1 a) 
(2:n. ) 
2,3 .Hypothe"!iical Syllogism 
1 3'4- Conjunction 
In an .appal"ent attempt to nullify these, and other, criticisms, 
3e8.1'>le ha::;l omitted the ceteri,s lJarib;u,s, clause from Db) and (4-b J and 
subs'ti tuted nas regar'ds his obliga:t;ion Ii fox' the ceter"i.!!. p"er.1b?s c1�\.use 
in (4-b ), and 11 the time of the obligating peri'ormance 11 1'01" the ceteri� 
peribus clause in (3b)<1; F'urther., he has given an analysis of the c oncept; 
t >ill Ii 
of pl�omising� setting clown necessa.ry and suf1"icient conditions for the 
non··defective perf'orrilance of the speech a.ct of Pl"O:tllising ',Jhich are II .... I> 
2L' in t<. pe17fectly ordinary sense empirical condi t10ns «> If Irt1,iS is don.e 11 of 
course, in his book Speech �e Although Searle says HIt f0110"l1$s fro'rll 
s 
seems to 
fS ob ct 
up. eliminating 
clauses he ..:;.;:;.;::;..::;.:;;;.:;;:.- obviou sly the to 
criticism 
one o:f 
which are, 
Thomson; butl!l"s's Thomas Perry 
clauses s eems to 
two new developments in 
u s  
the· ordinary s ense conditions" 
arle's analysis, neces sary and suf:ficlent conditions 
:for the non-de:fective perfoI'Ulance o:f a promise" I sugges t  we at 
very carefully in order to determine whether or not they re 
that an be undertaken whenever a non-defective promise 
made. 
i s 
a sentence T the 
o:f 
if and only 
1 
to the of an. obligation; th'lUl �I 8e 
conditions entail that S places hims elf undeJ:' a.l'1 obligat;i on � then 
one, -two, 01" all three of t;be la st three conditions must be suff'icient 
f'or this entailment " 8ea1'le seems to agree �1i th thiS, forne . says" in 
the brief' discussion folloV'Jing the statement of condition 7, IINotice 
that in the s tatement of the c ondition vrre only specify the speaker '8 
intention; f'urtheI' condi t:I.ons 1i1ill mal{e clear how that int�ention is 
d !f2'1 th d . 1 dit . 7 d g realize " .BUt, as e rea er can plallk y see, con -�ons an v are 
mere statements of the speakerfs intentions, complicated as they may 
bee It simply does not follow t'rom a statement of intentions that an 
obligation vias undel�takene And condition 9 is no help, since it merely 
asserts that condit:I.ons 1 -8 are the necessary and sufficient conditions 
for non-defectively promising according to the rules of' the dialect 
spoken by Sand H. So Searle still has tbe problem of the apparent 
inconSistency in simultaneously maintaining that promising is, by 
defini tion, the undertaldng of an obligation" and that c ertain condi­
tions <, which do not require the undertaking of an obligation are s uf-
ficient f or non-defectively promising. 
No't>1, 'I'fhat about the other tactic Searle "takes in S:eeech, :�cl::.: 
the elimination of t;he ceteri",s E.eribus clauses from Db) and (Ll.b)" 
lilirst let us consider the step f'rom Lj. to 5", Here I think that 
Searle may be right" I-1uch of the l�idespread interest generated 
by his 1 964 paper seems to have been due to an assumption on the 
pal.,t of many readers that he vIas at least sur�'2;est.in.g a method by 
i'1hich mOl"'al 'ought""st.atements t might be dect'uced :from verified 
empirical statements and tautologies" Given that assumption, one 
could rightly insist that the c.eteris per.1�J:lsu clause is essential 
at; this point of the proof" ];i .... or although Jones is under an obli­
gation to paY3l wb ether he ought morally to pay 1rlill depend on 
other circumstances. But Searle nevel'> claimed to shmv us ho-vr to 
pl"ove that Jones ought mora.lly to pay; indeed, he explicitly 
abstained fl"om suc b. a cl8..i111" I don wt see ho�! he can e"ven be aceused 
of sting that moral statements could be dero.Ol'J.Stl"ated 
tihe 'bype of aI'gument Hhich he sets forth ., So I am not; going to 
'chi s 
The s e  things canno t  be s aid, hOitleVe r ,  abou t  his eliminat ion 
of c�e ter is per ibtl s. considerations e arlj� er in t b e  pro 01"' , i .. e * '  1;vhere he sub s tIt u te s  l ine 3 & ,  above , [ 1 3a. All t ho s e  '�fho place 
-chelus e lve s unde r  an obl i gat i on are ( at the t ime when they s o  
place the ms elve s ) under an obl i gat i on .. f 28) fOl" the s 'i:;ateIllent s  
l i ) that all t b o s e  v-1ho place thems elve s under an obl igati on 
8.1"e J o ther things b e ing e q u al , under" an obligati on " and ( i 1 ) 
that; other things are equal . Here the o b j e c ti on i s  not that 
Searle will be unable to prove 8. mOl"al s tatement wi thout u s ing 
a ce teri s. J2eribus cl au se jJ but tha'c he' will not have a s ound 
de du c tive ar'gument vlithout one .29 
Thomas Perry, the proponent o f  t h i s  ob j e ction ,  points out "Ghat 
IIplac ing oneself under (undert aking ) an obl iga tion II in {2a. ) can be 
t aken to mean e i ther one of two th ing s : e i ther it me ans 1I ., ..., s ome thing 
l;o,re alr l ike f intending ( or a"l;t emp t ing or purporting ) 'GO acquire an obl i­
g at i on i lagr i t  means 11 11' 11'  co s ome t h ing s tronge r l ilte f ac t u ally acqu il'1 ing 
an obl igation when int ending ( or att empting or purport ing ) t o  do s o  .. v n31  
If the s e cond me an ing i s  the operat ive one , I i  .. "", then 2 a  i s  fal s e  unles s  
32 
we add a c e t�r 1 s  E.er ibus clau s e  t o  i t  .. It If' 'che fir s t  meaning i s  'I;he 
operative one , then (2a ) is true $ but I I  .. ... i'l;. is not -ta"'ue (contl" ary to 
3a ) tihat all 1vho unde rtake a:n obl igat i on {in this 1I1eak sense l ara 
under ar.l. obli gat :i.on.w even at 'tb e  very moment '�vhen they thus undert ake 
33 
t o  b e c ome obl iged .. n .  tmy s o ?  
.. ..  /it i f  ttl had :i.l1du c e d  Jone s to make the promise through fraud, 
tihen at no t ime ir!Quld Jone s h ave be en unde r an obligat ion to do 
What he promi s e d ., lind I think bot;h common s en s e  and c ommon l alv 
lnl'ill als o  re c ogni z e  various ot,her c ircums tan c e s  under �-Jhich th.e 
maldng of' a promi s e  crea t e s  n o  obl:Lg/il.:t; ion at all "  Suppose Smith 
pre ss ure s J'one s  into giving b.im a promi s sory note ., A COUl"t '�'1ill 
want to know vTbe ther the SOJ:,t of pre s sure applie d by Smi tb 1'la8 
w:Uihin h i s  l e gal r igbt s ;  if i t  iv-as I' then. the no te may be enfor­
c e able ; o ther1rJ' i s e  not ", Or again ;J  if Jone s promi s e s  only be cau s e  
o f'  s OIlle mi s taken as sumpt ion 01' :f act on b t s  part � then ( depending 
on i.'lhat sort 01' fact i t  l s , and v'lhat the o the r cir'cums tan c e s  ar e 
l ike ) he may not be under an obligat i on to Ite ep h is promis e  .. 
�'lhe ·ther el l: no t he i s 1'li11 depend , in lal'l and in common s ens e , on 
vll'ha.t seems fair aJ.1.d r easonable Jl all things c ons idere d  .. And fI'aud ,  
dUre s s  mi s t a..1{e are not the only sorts 0:[' prior c t ance s 
line 
will that in cases of these kinds 
t akefJ negligence ) the conditions necess ary for u t terance 
' I  hereby promise • • •  (etc. ) i  to constitute the speech 
act of promis ing would never h ave obtained.. But this is rather 
obvious ly incorrect .. There are , of course, various conditions of 
action which mus t  obtain if such an utterance is to be an act of 
promising . if we take common speech and as our guides fJ 
these conditions do not include ab.!ence of fraud and negligent 
repre.!entation by the promi.!ee .. 34 
f S  argument is very persuas ive , andfJ seem.! to me, 
Indeed, all of the criticisms of Sear1e t a  argument heretofore cons 
seem s ucces sful . I am not through with t .  There 
are other criticisms worth considering : one from A .  Co Genova, 
connec 
an 
occurs 
as 
ones 
other from James C. Anders on .. 
a s to that which I 
with several attempts to derive evaluative statements 
premises that hinged on definitions that turn ou t to 
now 
• @ .. and if 
) : one is 
s 
one 
if the conclusion 
is by 
s re.ason s . " .  
t his u se 
to t 
obl to 
to one 
( 2 a ) promises are aC 
an 
an " , " . ,, " 
can s 
i s  no t be c au s e  
t tology e s c ape route 
why we should believe that analyti ci ty 
• 
. 
evaluative forc e .  the contrary, i t  would s e em 
the pre suppos itions of Searle i s  spee ch ac t  theory r e -
that the s e  two var i able s  remain independent . If 
force doe s not on meaning or c ontent , only on 
purp o s e  to which u tt eranc e s  are dire ct e d, then ne i the r 
i t  turn on the analyti c  or synthe t i c  charact e r  of 
c ontent . 
hypotheti c al e s c ape rout e  won ' t  work be c au s e  the 
be inte rpreted as a s pe c i al kind of e valu ation ,  
one , or,  an evaluati on a poss ible s tate of 
cri t i c i sm offered by Jame s C o  Ander s on 0 
dis t in c t i on between illo cut i onary forc e and 
t i  
a 
t content . To me , i t  s e ems . the mos t  ingenious ; and to 
t he mo s t  s 
� e ems t o  me , 
c on -
s e are 
e 1 
no t 
s e ems that the 
this i s  t o  c on side r illo force as a 
fUnction of me aning e 
At any rate I am not prepared t o  pre s ent a general theory of 
s pe e ch act s  at thi s  t ime ® As for the achievement of the 
paper, defending the nonder ivability the s is again s t  the all eged 
c ounterexampl e s , w e  cons idered all o f  Searle t s  c andidate s , and 
a fe't'l o thers be s ide s ,  ultimate ly di smi s sing them all as 
I l e ave the reader t o  e valuat e  for h ims elf whether o r  no t thei r  d is ­
mis s al was in e ach cas e adequate ly ju s tif i e d® 
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